论文标题
重新审视激励兼容的单参数机制的表征
Characterization of incentive compatible single-parameter mechanisms revisited
论文作者
论文摘要
我们重新检查了Archer＆Tardos（2001）中引入的激励兼容单参数机制的表征。我们认为，所声称的独特结果，称为“迈尔森的引理”。我们提供了独特性的基本证明，该证明统一了文献中使用的两类分配函数的演示，并表明一般情况是实际功能理论鲜为人知的结果。我们还澄清，我们的独特性证明比上一个更基本。最后，通过将我们的表征结果推广到更大的维度，我们为多单位拍卖和组合拍卖提供了替代的收入等效结果证明。
We reexamine the characterization of incentive compatible single-parameter mechanisms introduced in Archer & Tardos(2001). We argue that the claimed uniqueness result, called `Myerson's Lemma' was not well established. We provide an elementary proof of uniqueness that unifies the presentation for two classes of allocation functions used in the literature and show that the general case is a consequence of a little known result from the theory of real functions. We also clarify that our proof of uniqueness is more elementary than the previous one. Finally, by generalizing our characterization result to more dimensions, we provide alternative proofs of revenue equivalence results for multiunit auctions and combinatorial auctions.
