论文标题
对建筑自动化系统的网络物理安全性的批判性审查
A critical review of cyber-physical security for building automation systems
论文作者
论文摘要
现代建筑自动化系统(Bass)作为使智能建筑物智能的大脑通常需要在系统组件和外部实体之间提高连接性,例如通过外包云分析和增加的建筑网格集成通过外包自动化进行优化的自动化。但是,增加的连接性和可访问性随着网络安全威胁的增加而伴随着。低音在历史上是作为封闭环境而开发的,网络安全考虑因素有限。结果,许多建筑物中的低音容易受到可能导致不良后果的网络攻击的影响,例如乘员不适,能源过多和意外设备停机。因此,迫切需要推进低音的网络物理安全性的最先进,并为建筑物的攻击缓解提供实用的解决方案。但是,目前缺乏对BAS脆弱性,具有影响评估的潜在网络攻击,检测和防御方法以及网络安全弹性控制策略的包容性回顾。这篇评论论文通过在商业建筑中对低音的网络物理安全进行全面的最新审查来填补差距:管理级别,自动化水平和现场级别。审查了四个主要的BAS协议的一般低音漏洞和特定于协议的特定漏洞,然后讨论四个攻击目标和七个潜在的攻击情景。网络攻击对低音的影响总结为信号损坏,信号延迟和信号阻塞。在三个级别上确定了典型的网络攻击检测和防御方法。攻击下低音的网络安全弹性控制策略分为被动和主动的弹性控制方案。最终讨论了公开挑战和未来的机会。
Modern Building Automation Systems (BASs), as the brain that enables the smartness of a smart building, often require increased connectivity both among system components as well as with outside entities, such as optimized automation via outsourced cloud analytics and increased building-grid integrations. However, increased connectivity and accessibility come with increased cyber security threats. BASs were historically developed as closed environments with limited cyber-security considerations. As a result, BASs in many buildings are vulnerable to cyber-attacks that may cause adverse consequences, such as occupant discomfort, excessive energy usage, and unexpected equipment downtime. Therefore, there is a strong need to advance the state-of-the-art in cyber-physical security for BASs and provide practical solutions for attack mitigation in buildings. However, an inclusive and systematic review of BAS vulnerabilities, potential cyber-attacks with impact assessment, detection & defense approaches, and cyber-secure resilient control strategies is currently lacking in the literature. This review paper fills the gap by providing a comprehensive up-to-date review of cyber-physical security for BASs at three levels in commercial buildings: management level, automation level, and field level. The general BASs vulnerabilities and protocol-specific vulnerabilities for the four dominant BAS protocols are reviewed, followed by a discussion on four attack targets and seven potential attack scenarios. The impact of cyber-attacks on BASs is summarized as signal corruption, signal delaying, and signal blocking. The typical cyber-attack detection and defense approaches are identified at the three levels. Cyber-secure resilient control strategies for BASs under attack are categorized into passive and active resilient control schemes. Open challenges and future opportunities are finally discussed.