论文标题
政府部长选举
Election of government ministers
论文作者
论文摘要
行政部门（政府）通常不是人民直接选举的，而是由另一个当选的机构或议会或总统等人创建的。结果，其成员并不直接对人民或作为一个小组负责。 我们提出了一个场景，政府成员直接由人民选举产生，并寻求在此过程中实现比例代表。 我们将提出一个正式的模型，用于分配K办公室，每个模型都与一组与该席位竞争的候选人相关联。 一群选民为每个办公室提供选票。由于独立为每个办公室使用简单的多数投票可能会导致少数群体的偏好被完全忽略，因此在这里，我们将贪婪的比例批准投票（Greedypypav）调整为我们的框架。 在选举行政部门的文章中，您可以找到对模型的深入解释，并通过基于计算机的模拟进行演示，即如何使用该规则来克服这一弱点并维护相称性的公理。 在本文中，我们将在上述文章中介绍Rutvik Page，Ehud Shapiro和Nimrod Talmon提出的算法（Greedypav）的实施。此外，我们通过一项调查测试了我们的实施，其结果将在文章后面介绍和分析。
The executive branch (the government) is usually not directly elected by the people, but is created by another elected body or person such as the parliament or the president. As a result, its members are not directly accountable to the people, individually or as a group. We propose a scenario where government members are directly elected by the people, and seek to achieve proportional representation in the process. We will present a formal model for the allocation of K offices, each associated with a disjoint set of candidates contesting for that seat. A group of voters provides ballots for each of the offices. Since using simple majority voting for each office independently may result in minority preferences being completely ignored, here we adapt the greedy version of proportional approval voting (GreedyPAV) to our framework. In the article Electing the Executive Branch you can find an in-depth explanation of the model and a demonstration - through computer-based simulations - of how voting for all offices together using this rule overcomes this weakness and upholds the axiom of proportionality. In this article, we will present the implementation of the algorithm (GreedyPAV) proposed by Rutvik Page, Ehud Shapiro, and Nimrod Talmon in the article mentioned above. In addition, we tested our implementation through a survey, the results of which will be presented and analyzed later in the article.
