论文标题
克隆的明显独立性
Obvious Independence of Clones
论文作者
论文摘要
克隆（IOC）标准的独立性衡量了投票规则对战略提名的鲁棒性。先前的文献从经验上确定，由于未能识别SP财产，个人即使在防策略（SP）设置中仍可能会提交昂贵的，失真的误报。这些问题的交集促使人们寻找明显独立于克隆（OIOC）的机制：在战略提名/退出克隆的情况下显然对结果没有影响。我们对投票规则（OIOC）构建了正式和直观的定义，并检查了五个IOC规则，以确定它们是否满足OIOC。
The Independence of Clones (IoC) criterion measures a voting rule's robustness to strategic nomination. Prior literature has established empirically that individuals may still submit costly, distortionary misreports even in strategy-proof (SP) settings, due to failure to recognize the SP property. The intersection of these issues motivates the search for mechanisms that are Obviously Independent of Clones (OIoC): where strategic nomination/exiting of clones obviously has no effect on the outcome. We construct a formal and intuitive definition of a voting rule being OIoC and examine five IoC rules to identify whether they satisfy OIoC.
