论文标题
梵语：基于零星认证的顺序逻辑加密方案
SANSCrypt: A Sporadic-Authentication-Based Sequential Logic Encryption Scheme
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提出了Sanscrypt，这是一种新型的顺序逻辑加密方案，以保护综合电路免受反向工程的影响。以前的顺序加密方法着重于修改电路状态计算机，以便仅应用正确的键序列可以访问正确的功能。考虑到与一次性身份验证相关的风险，Sanscrypt通过要求用户根据基于伪随机数生成的协议来零星执行多个身份验证，从而采用了逻辑加密的新的时间维度。对一组基准电路的分析和验证结果表明，如果不正确地应用密钥序列，梵文提供了实质性的输出损坏性。此外，它对现有攻击（包括基于SAT的攻击）具有指数的韧性，同时保持了相当低的开销。
We propose SANSCrypt, a novel sequential logic encryption scheme to protect integrated circuits against reverse engineering. Previous sequential encryption methods focus on modifying the circuit state machine such that the correct functionality can be accessed by applying the correct key sequence only once. Considering the risk associated with one-time authentication, SANSCrypt adopts a new temporal dimension to logic encryption, by requiring the user to sporadically perform multiple authentications according to a protocol based on pseudo-random number generation. Analysis and validation results on a set of benchmark circuits show that SANSCrypt offers a substantial output corruptibility if the key sequences are applied incorrectly. Moreover, it exhibits an exponential resilience to existing attacks, including SAT-based attacks, while maintaining a reasonably low overhead.
