论文标题
生物脑安全 - 作为战争辅助的融合威胁
Biocybersecurity -- A Converging Threat as an Auxiliary to War
论文作者
论文摘要
Biodefense是确保相对于某些生物体的生物安全性并限制其传播的学科。这个领域越来越受到自然界的新型威胁的挑战,这些威胁已被武器化,例如SARS,炭疽和类似的病原体,但通过国家和世界卫生团体的合作而取得了胜利。但是,随着该领域与网络世界的相交,这可能会承受额外的压力 - 在这个世界上,政府已经在努力跟上从小到州级行动者的网络攻击,因为网络策略已依赖于国际争议中的竞争领域。通过网络攻击对军事物流和经济的中断已经可以通过传统的军事手段仅限于经济和道德成本的一部分来弥补,这使其成为越来越诱人的破坏手段。在生物学安全领域(BCS)中,生物技术和网络安全中的优势以及它们的许多脆弱性,这可能会使生物陷入困境的麻烦越来越大,因为新型威胁可以通过在生物疗法和网络核能中看到的攻击路线融合而融合在一起。在此,我们提供了一个探索生物抑制性领域的威胁如何通过较少预见的路线而出现的,因为它可能是传统战争的有吸引力的辅助。这是通过分析潜在有效载荷和交付方法来开发概念威胁矢量化的。我们以几个范式来查看基于BCS的威胁。
Biodefense is the discipline of ensuring biosecurity with respect to select groups of organisms and limiting their spread. This field has increasingly been challenged by novel threats from nature that have been weaponized such as SARS, Anthrax, and similar pathogens, but has emerged victorious through collaboration of national and world health groups. However, it may come under additional stress in the 21st century as the field intersects with the cyberworld -- a world where governments have already been struggling to keep up with cyber attacks from small to state-level actors as cyberthreats have been relied on to level the playing field in international disputes. Disruptions to military logistics and economies through cyberattacks have been able to be done at a mere fraction of economic and moral costs through conventional military means, making it an increasingly tempting means of disruption. In the field of biocybersecurity (BCS), the strengths within biotechnology and cybersecurity merge, along with many of their vulnerabilities, and this could spell increased trouble for biodefense, as novel threats can be synthesized and disseminated in ways that fuse the routes of attacks seen in biosecurity and cybersecurity. Herein, we offer an exploration of how threats in the domain of biocybersecurity may emerge through less foreseen routes as it might be an attractive auxiliary to conventional war. This is done through an analysis of potential payload and delivery methods to develop notional threat vectorizations. We conclude with several paradigms through which to view BCS-based threats.