论文标题
关于通过互补性解决离散约束的NASH-Cournot游戏的注释
A Note on Solving Discretely-Constrained Nash-Cournot Games via Complementarity
论文作者
论文摘要
在各种竞争能源生产环境中，纳什 - 库诺（Nash-Cournot）的纳什 - 库诺游戏（Nash-Cournot Games）引起了人们的关注，在这些环境中，玩家必须做出一个或多个离散的决策。 Gabriel等。 [“解决具有对电力市场的应用程序的纳什 - 库诺游戏。”网络和空间经济学13（3），2013年]声称，均衡的NASH-Cournot游戏集合与相应的离散构成的混合互补性问题的解决方案相吻合。我们证明这一说法是错误的。
Discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games have attracted attention as they arise in various competitive energy production settings in which players must make one or more discrete decisions. Gabriel et al. ["Solving discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games with an application to power markets." Networks and Spatial Economics 13(3), 2013] claim that the set of equilibria to a discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot game coincides with the set of solutions to a corresponding discretely-constrained mixed complementarity problem. We show that this claim is false.
