论文标题

进料关税合同计划和监管不确定性

Feed-in Tariff Contract Schemes and Regulatory Uncertainty

论文作者

Barbosa, Luciana, Nunes, Cláudia, Rodrigues, Artur, Sardinha, Alberto

论文摘要

本文对市场和监管不确定性下的两种饲养费(FIT)进行了新的分析,即带有帽子和地板的滑动溢价以及最低价格保证。监管不确定性是通过泊松过程建模的,因此跳跃事件可以在合同签名之前降低关税。使用半分析的实际选项框架,我们得出了项目价值,最佳投资阈值以及这些方案的投资机会的价值。考虑到最佳投资阈值,我们还将上述两个拟合物与固定价格拟合和固定优先级拟合进行了比较,这是文献中已广泛研究的政策方案。我们的结果表明,增加跳跃事件的可能性降低了所有计划的投资门槛。此外,当降低关税时,投资门槛也会下降。我们还根据相应的最佳投资阈值比较了四个方案。例如,我们发现滑行溢价的投资阈值低于最低价格保证。该结果表明,第一个制度比后者更好,因为它可以加速投资,同时避免对生产者的收入过多。

This paper presents a novel analysis of two feed-in tariffs (FIT) under market and regulatory uncertainty, namely a sliding premium with cap and floor and a minimum price guarantee. Regulatory uncertainty is modeled with a Poisson process, whereby a jump event may reduce the tariff before the signature of the contract. Using a semi-analytical real options framework, we derive the project value, the optimal investment threshold, and the value of the investment opportunity for these schemes. Taking into consideration the optimal investment threshold, we also compare the two aforementioned FITs with the fixed-price FIT and the fixed-premium FIT, which are policy schemes that have been extensively studied in the literature. Our results show that increasing the likelihood of a jump event lowers the investment threshold for all the schemes; moreover, the investment threshold also decreases when the tariff reduction increases. We also compare the four schemes in terms of the corresponding optimal investment thresholds. For example, we find that the investment threshold of the sliding premium is lower than the minimum price guarantee. This result suggests that the first regime is a better policy than the latter because it accelerates the investment while avoiding excessive earnings to producers.

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