论文标题
与漏水源相关的测量设备与量子键分布
Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution with Leaky Sources
论文作者
论文摘要
与测量设备无关的量子密钥分布（MDI-QKD）可以从量子通信系统中删除所有检测侧通道。但是，安全证明要求满足来源上的某些假设。例如，这包括要求发件人发射器没有信息泄漏的要求，不幸的是，在实践中很难保证。在本文中，我们通过提出一种普通形式主义来证明MDI-QKD的安全性，放宽了这一不切实际的假设。借助这种形式主义，我们分析了两种突出的MDI-QKD方案的有限键安全性 - 一种对称的三强诱饵状态MDI-QKD协议和四强诱饵状态MDI-QKD协议 - 并确定它们从强度调制器和递送器相位调节器中的信息泄漏的稳健性。我们的工作表明，鉴于源已经足够隔离，MDI-QKD在合理的信号传输时间范围内是可行的。因此，它为实验者提供了必不可少的参考，以确保在存在信息泄漏的情况下MDI-QKD的实验实现的安全性。
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) can remove all detection side-channels from quantum communication systems. The security proofs require, however, that certain assumptions on the sources are satisfied. This includes, for instance, the requirement that there is no information leakage from the transmitters of the senders, which unfortunately is very difficult to guarantee in practice. In this paper we relax this unrealistic assumption by presenting a general formalism to prove the security of MDI-QKD with leaky sources. With this formalism, we analyze the finite-key security of two prominent MDI-QKD schemes - a symmetric three-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol and a four-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol - and determine their robustness against information leakage from both the intensity modulator and the phase modulator of the transmitters. Our work shows that MDI-QKD is feasible within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission given that the sources are sufficiently isolated. Thus, it provides an essential reference for experimentalists to ensure the security of experimental implementations of MDI-QKD in the presence of information leakage.
