论文标题
重新访问权限的区块链：拜占庭游戏理论观点
Permissioned Blockchain Revisited: A Byzantine Game-Theoretical Perspective
论文作者
论文摘要
尽管区块链的流行和实际适用性，但在区块链的理论基础上的工作非常有限：区块链背后缺乏严格的理论和分析，这严重缩小了其更广泛的应用。本文试图为特定类型的区块链奠定理论基础，即从参与者那里需要基本真实性的基础，也称为\ textit {许可的区块链}。我们通过纳入分布式计算和拜占庭系统所隐含的约束，将权限的区块链系统和操作提交游戏理论问题。我们表明，在非合作区块链游戏（NBG）中，即使该游戏涉及两个以上的玩家，nash平衡也可以有效地找到。令人惊讶的是，纳什平衡的模拟结果意味着，无论拜占庭节点和值得信赖的玩家的数量，游戏都可以达到稳定的地位。然后，我们研究一个更困难的问题，允许玩家组建联盟：联盟区块链游戏（CBG）。我们表明，尽管CBG的Shapley值可以以更简洁的形式表示，但其核心是空的。
Despite the popularity and practical applicability of blockchains, there is very limited work on the theoretical foundation of blockchains: The lack of rigorous theory and analysis behind the curtain of blockchains has severely staggered its broader applications. This paper attempts to lay out a theoretical foundation for a specific type of blockchains---the ones requiring basic authenticity from the participants, also called \textit{permissioned blockchain}. We formulate permissioned blockchain systems and operations into a game-theoretical problem by incorporating constraints implied by the wisdom from distributed computing and Byzantine systems. We show that in a noncooperative blockchain game (NBG), a Nash equilibrium can be efficiently found in a closed-form even though the game involves more than two players. Somewhat surprisingly, the simulation results of the Nash equilibrium implies that the game can reach a stable status regardless of the number of Byzantine nodes and trustworthy players. We then study a harder problem where players are allowed to form coalitions: the coalitional blockchain game (CBG). We show that although the Shapley value for a CBG can be expressed in a more succinct form, its core is empty.
